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THE MANAGING LAWMAKER IN 
CYBERSPACE: 
A POWER MODEL 
Tamar Frankel * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article is about power — the ability to gain obedience 
whether by captivating followers, persuading skeptics or 
awarding and withdrawing economic benefits. The purpose of 
this Article is to analyze how the power of the Internet Corpo-
ration for Names and Numbers (“ICANN”) was created, aug-
mented, strengthened and reined in. Many controversies sur-
round ICANN, including the very foundation of its existence — 
the need for a single “root” in the Internet naming infrastruc-
ture — its organizational form and accountability, and the 
utterances, policies and actions of its management.  
The purpose of this Article is not to argue and prescribe but 
to describe and explain. Description, however, is rarely, if ever, 
neutral. This Article is no exception. The author is biased in 
favor of the ICANN experiment. I hope it matures to become a 
  
 * Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.  I owe many of the 
clarifications in this Article to comments of David Johnson; Kenneth A. Cuk-
ier, a journalist who is currently writing a book about the Internet Corpora-
tion for Names and Numbers; and Professor Michael Meurer of Boston Uni-
versity School of Law.  
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model for a global organization — with a limited mission, 
grounded in a unique type of consensus, and operated in a spe-
cial kind of balance of power environment. I hope that ICANN’s 
processes and activities will reflect the spirit of the Internet 
that it influences. I hope that it will exercise its power only to 
address problems when they arise, and nurture innovation 
whenever possible. I hope that the Internet community and 
ICANN will follow the  “rule of consensus” just as civil societies 
follow the rule of law. Events in the past month are perhaps 
bringing the issues to a head, but at this stage my crystal ball 
is dim and hope reigns supreme.  
ICANN operates in a dual capacity: as a manager and a 
lawmaker. It provides high-level management of some of the 
Internet’s operational infrastructure. I use the term manage-
ment in a very broad sense. ICANN neither operates nor fully 
controls any of the actors that constitute the Internet’s infra-
structure. It has, however, power, in varied degrees, to direct 
these actors.1 For lack of a better word, I call this direction 
“managing.” In addition, ICANN establishes some of the Inter-
net’s constitutive rules that facilitate universal connectivity.2 It 
has used its power to determine the process under which new 
top-level domain names (“TLDs”) are allocated. To this extent it 
is a lawmaker. 
The inquiry into ICANN is important because ICANN plays 
a significant role in the operation of the Internet. The inquiry 
is interesting because, like the Internet, ICANN has no precise 
analog.3 The inquiry is difficult because the location and iden-
  
 1. ICANN’s power over the Internet service providers (“ISPs”) is mini-
mal, and depends on their consensus of using a single root. Its power over the 
registries of most country code top-level domain names is limited, but it can 
exert more pressure on registries of generic top-level domain names. See infra 
Part II.A.1-2.  
 2. ICANN plays a lesser role with respect to ISPs. Large ISPs can decide 
whether to point at the ICANN root. They have no contractual obligation to 
follow ICANN’s policies, or otherwise interact with ICANN except in connec-
tion with the allocation of intellectual property blocks.   
 3. Some international organizations, such as the International Olympic 
Commission and the Diamond Exchange, have arisen not by the support of 
governments or laws, but through the initiative of participants. Similar ini-
tiatives have given rise to national organizations, such as stock exchanges, 
trade organizations and professional associations. However, they differ from 
ICANN in a number of important aspects. They were organized directly by 
the interested parties; their purpose of organization was usually quite spe-
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tity of ICANN’s power is murky, contradictory and confusing. 
Its power structure is fashioned after a private not-for-profit 
corporation, but it does not operate an enterprise that such a 
corporation usually operates, like a museum, hospital or a 
membership organization of credit card issuers. ICANN’s op-
erations involve an enigma — the Internet — which defies a 
clear analogy. The Internet has been defined as: a new world 
community; the foundation of democracy; a communication sys-
tem; a form of commerce; a network of networks; and a novel 
technology. Each definition brings an analogy to relationships 
and power structures. It has been suggested that new tech-
nologies undergo a process of chaos and finally settle at some-
thing close to familiar models, with some adjustments.4 I be-
lieve that this thesis is correct, and that what we see today is a 
stage in the evolutionary process of the Internet and its infra-
structure. However, the road to the ultimate adjusted model 
may determine its choice.  The road to ICANN’s final model 
may be less bumpy if the model reflects the characteristics of 
the Internet. I believe that the Internet is closer to a market. 
Therefore, I analogize ICANN to a manager of a unique type of  
market. 
The use of the market image for the Internet and its infra-
structure may seem counterintuitive. More often, ICANN’s im-
age is drawn from the store of political metaphors as a global 
government, and its users as citizens; the relationship among 
users, service providers and ICANN is thereby grounded in a 
“social contract.” Markets and political units share some fea-
tures. Both require an infrastructure and an implicit agree-
ment — a consensus — among most actors as to the fundamen-
tal “rules of the game.” Mainly, these rules are born of a rule of 
consensus, which people follow even if they are free not to do 
so.  A “social contract” governs many aspects of our lives, and 
so do the markets on which we draw for the essentials for liv-
ing and for earning our livelihood. The distinction, therefore, 
between the two is not in impact but perhaps in the enforce-
ment power. The markets’ coercive powers are more limited. 
Yet concern for the integrity of the system (whether the politi-
  
cific (such as the Olympic games) or for the purpose of regulating their mem-
bers, and most national organizations are regulated by governments, who 
serve as backup regulators.  
 4. See DEBORA L. SPAR, RULING THE WAVES 11-22 (2001). 
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cal or economic system) drives many dissenters on details to 
adhere to the general rules of the majority. It seems that the 
main difference is in the kinds of enforcement tools that mar-
kets can use. In that respect, ICANN’s enforcement tools re-
semble those of the markets and not those of the political units. 
I believe that even though ICANN’s objectives and powers 
have not yet been fully defined, its analog is closer to the New 
York Stock Exchange, Inc. (“NYSE”) than to a civil society. 
ICANN’s foundation is grounded in technical and business 
practices, the objectives of its social contract are limited, and it 
lacks coercive state power. Therefore, I stick to my market 
model. But because the Internet affects social interaction, and 
because it is evolving, I admit to ICANN’s political under-
tones.5 
Perhaps because of ICANN’s political aspects, the Internet 
market and ICANN differ from the securities markets and 
their managing lawmakers. ICANN and the actors constituting 
the infrastructure of the Internet are essentially unregulated.6 
Their accountability to a “higher authority,” such as the De-
  
 5. I do not analogize ICANN to the United Nations or its organizations, 
first because UN membership is usually limited to political units, while 
ICANN was explicitly designed to exclude the control, though not the influ-
ence, of such units. In addition, the UN’s decisions can be backed by force, 
while it is doubtful whether ICANN’s will ever have such a backing.  See 
NANCY C.M. HARTSOCK, MONEY, SEX, AND POWER 55 (1983) (dealing with eco-
nomic markets, noting the disparities among the actors and arguing that the 
market model legitimizes domination by the strong actors over the weaker 
actors). ICANN can be analogized to the NYSE. Both institutions act as a 
focal point and as a synthesizer among the disparate parts that constitute the 
infrastructure of a system. Both pass rules affecting the infrastructure of the 
markets. ICANN deals with the domain name registries and the registrars, 
and to some extent influences the ISPs. The NYSE deals with the underwrit-
ers, brokers and dealers. Both Internet actors and securities market actors 
operate independently, some for profit and some not for profit. Both the 
NYSE and ICANN combine management and lawmaking. Both have a board 
of directors, officers and employees who carry out institutional functions. 
Both are in the public eye, for all to see and judge. Like the New York brokers 
who gathered on the curb in the late eighteenth century, ICANN’s creators 
started by interacting and searching for a network communication unlimited 
by subject matter and purposes.  
 6. ICANN is a not-for-profit corporation incorporated under the laws of 
California. However, the regulatory scope of both laws and enforcers of laws 
is very limited.  See ICANN, ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION (1998), available at 
http://www.icann.org/general/articles.htm [hereinafter ARTS. OF 
INCORPORATION].  
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partment of Commerce (“DOC”), is unclear. Even the authority 
of the DOC is subject to queries. Moreover, ICANN functions 
partly as a policy setting institution, partly as a platform for 
negotiation and mediation. ICANN has not yet reached matur-
ity, and is likely to operate in a state of flexible adjustment for 
some time to come. Recent events suggest that the state of flux 
may also turn into a state of shocks, counter shocks, restruc-
ture and substitution.  
ICANN poses a number of puzzles. First, it is essentially an 
unregulated and undemocratic natural monopoly. It is manag-
ing and making rules for a hierarchical system that, in the 
view of experts, cannot be governed by two entities efficiently. 
Yet ICANN’s power at its inception was quite weak. How can a 
monopoly be weak? Is not a weak monopoly a contradiction in 
terms?  
Part II of this Article addresses this query. After a brief de-
scription of the basic structure of the Internet naming and 
numbering system relevant to ICANN’s power, Part II de-
scribes the unique circumstances under which ICANN was cre-
ated to explain its weak initial existence. ICANN’s power was 
and remains a default power. There were many candidates for 
managing and controlling ICANN’s functions. All vied for the 
position. But no candidate agreed that any of the others would 
take control of the entity. ICANN’s power stemmed from the 
consensus by the parties that none of them would control. 
ICANN was not vested with power. It came into being by the 
grace of powerful constituencies that refrained from asserting 
their power. Hence, ICANN’s weakness.  
A second puzzle follows. While ICANN started weak, it has 
managed to become far stronger. How could this weak monop-
oly become stronger with time? Part III of this Article offers an 
answer. ICANN has maintained and strengthened its following 
by strongly supporting the stability of the Internet (standardiz-
ing the infrastructure). This prime directive of maintaining 
stability is of great concern to almost everyone around the 
globe. In addition, ICANN’s staff has taken special care to en-
sure that none of the potential claimants to ICANN’s control 
would be sufficiently displeased to attempt to wrench control 
over it. The staff solved problems through mediation. Other 
events and external parties helped. ICANN has flexed its mus-
cles in exercising the powers clearly vested in it, that is, allo-
cating the valuable right to operate TLDs.  ICANN has aug-
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mented its power through a stable and able management, in-
cluding the preparation of its contracts, which contain signifi-
cant powers. This staff has steered ICANN through the turbu-
lent waters of complex international and national laws, super-
vised its statements and negotiated on its behalf. Part III of 
this Article offers a few examples that demonstrate ICANN’s 
rising power.  
However, in the past month, ICANN’s staff proposed to re-
structure the institution. The new structure would eliminate 
some of the constraints under which the staff was operating, 
expand the staff and offer more powerful positions to constitu-
ents that would finance ICANN and its expansion.7 The pro-
posal would establish tighter control and greater power for 
ICANN and its staff, a self-perpetuating board representing 
the strong constituencies with vested interests in the Internet 
and lower input by the unorganized public.   
The proposal seems to have been approved by some constitu-
encies, but has prompted protests by others and raised ques-
tions in Congress (although ICANN’s restructure is not one of 
the main topics in Congress today). The result of these protests 
is unclear. Short-term, the staff may ignore them: the proposal 
may be a basis for negotiation and some “softening.” Long–
term, if controls tighten and public input shrinks, some predict 
a cessation of some parts of the infrastructure and perhaps a 
temporary split of the Internet.8 These developments support 
the explanation of ICANN’s rising powers. 
A third puzzle that ICANN poses relates to its current 
status. While it has flexed its muscles and become stronger, its 
exercise of power has been fairly contained. Since ICANN is a 
natural monopoly that has become stronger with time, what 
has prevented it in the past, and what prevents it today, from 
taking a far more high-handed and extensive ruling posture?  
Part IV of this Article deals with this question. The emer-
gence of ICANN, its staying power, and the limitations on the 
exercise of its power can be partly explained by an analogy to 
  
 7. See ICANN, PRESIDENT’S REPORT: ICANN – THE CASE FOR REFORM 
(2002), at http://www.icann.org/general/lynn-reform-proposal-24feb02.htm 
[hereinafter PRESIDENT’S REPORT]. 
 8. See A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to 
Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 181-82 (2000) 
[hereinafter Wrong Turn]. 
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the economic theory of “contestable markets.”9 The theory deals 
with price. I equate price to power. High prices denote a high 
level of power. Low prices denote a lower level of power. The 
theory of contestable markets suggests that in some cases a 
monopolist (or an oligopolist) will charge the low price it would 
have charged had the market been competitive. These are the 
cases in which the monopolist is more efficient than its poten-
tial competitors, and can therefore sell or service at lower 
prices. At these prices, the less efficient competitors would not 
enter the market.10  
  
 9. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY 
OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 5 (1982).  The authors state:  
 
We define a perfectly contestable market as one that is accessible to 
potential entrants and has the following two properties: First, the 
potential entrants can, without restriction, serve the same market 
demands and use the same productive techniques as those available 
to the incumbent firms. Thus, there are no entry barriers in the 
sense of the term used by Stigler. Second, the potential entrants 
evaluate the profitability of entry at the incumbent firms’ pre-entry 
prices. That is, although the potential entrants recognize that an ex-
pansion of industry outputs leads to lower prices — in accord with 
the market demand curves — the entrants nevertheless assume that 
if they undercut incumbents’ prices they can sell as much of the cor-
responding good as the quantity demanded by the market at their 
own prices.  
Id. “Stigler defines an entry barrier to be present when the potential entrants 
face costs greater than those incurred [by the incumbent].”  Id. 
 10. For example, if one airline provides an optimal service between two 
towns (e.g., twice a week), and charges a price that allows it minimal profits, 
no competing airline will choose the same route. Another example is tradi-
tional securities underwriting, which involves high risks and requires very 
high investment and a distribution system. Smaller broker-dealers did not 
enter this market because they could not compete with the very large under-
writers on price and reliable performance. Among the underwriters there 
exists an apex structure. In 1983, the structure was predicted to continue, 
and it seems in 2001 that it has. See SAMUEL L. HAYES III ET AL., COMPETITION 
IN THE INVESTMENT BANKING INDUSTRY 72-73, 76 (1983). The authors note 
research which suggests that “investment banking has long tended to assume 
a pyramidal competitive structure, with a few preeminent firms providing 
leadership in both financing and collateral services” and a tendency towards 
increased concentration. Id. at 78.  Nonetheless, the authors argue that this 
structure “masks a competitive structure” because the markets are seg-
mented.  Id. “[C]ertain types of clients and industries tend to gravitate to-
wards [certain types of investment bankers].”  Id. at 79.  
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Yet the monopolist will not raise the prices in contestable 
markets. In these markets, entry costs for potential competi-
tors would not be higher than the entry costs for the monopo-
list.11 For example, the cost of airplanes for two airlines will be 
close, if not identical. In addition, the exit costs for competitors 
would be zero or close to zero.12  Thus, the theory predicts that 
competitors will not enter the market only so long as they can-
not afford to charge the monopolist’s low prices. If, however, 
the monopolist charges higher prices, competitors will enter the 
market to offer the same service at the same prices or lower. 
When prices fall, these competitors will pocket their profits and 
exit the markets. This theory suggests that the “potential or 
threatened competition of possible new competitors” presents a 
great constraining force.13 Potential competition will “extend 
the beneficent sway of the invisible hand” that leads the mar-
ket.14  
The theory of contestable markets highlights a special “bal-
ance of power” and its restraining effect. I believe that a simi-
lar idea of a contestable market helps understand ICANN’s 
environment. To be sure, while its institutional structure is 
still evolving, ICANN’s existence and activities are based on a 
consensus among numerous power holders. More importantly, 
the large Internet service providers’ (“ISPs”) consensus to use a 
single root constitutes the foundation of ICANN’s power. Most 
importantly, the tugging pressure of “path dependence” in the 
case of ICANN is very great. It costs to change legacy-systems. 
A move by some and not by other participants of the infrastruc-
  
 11. See BAUMOL , supra note 9, at 7 (stating the airline industry as an ex-
ample).  
 12. For example, an airline can exit a route with little cost by redirecting 
its planes to another route.  
 13. BAUMOL, supra note 9, at 13. 
 14. The theory of contestable markets has led to the deregulation of the 
airlines, among others. Deregulation, however, demonstrated the flaws in the 
theory’s predictions. The correct monopolistic or competitive price absent 
actual competition is controversial. Entry barriers defined as “sunken costs” 
are difficult to determine. It was discovered that exit involves transaction 
costs. Further, there is a price lag that provides insufficient after-entry prof-
its for the entering competitors during the “hit-and-run” period. All these 
issues require correction, but judicial or government correction increases 
costs, and small corrections may result in far larger deviations.  Thus, appli-
cation of the theory is far from perfect.  See WILLIAM B. TYE, THE THEORY OF 
CONTESTABLE MARKETS (1990) (listing a number of flaws in the theory). 
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ture may endanger the universality and integrity of the Inter-
net. Even a slight move may generate a slippery slope towards 
disorder and unpredictability. The beneficent principle of “the 
devil you know” engenders an almost knee-jerk reaction in this 
case. Nonetheless, I believe that the need for one guiding hand 
— a natural monopoly, on the one hand, and the ability of some 
players to overthrow ICANN or particular actions of ICANN, as 
illuminated by the theory of contestable markets — limits 
ICANN’s exercise of power.  
The recent proposal to restructure ICANN supports the the-
sis of this Article.15 Under the proposal, public representation 
on ICANN’s board has been eliminated. Five of the nine direc-
tors’ seats reserved for representatives of the public were allo-
cated to representatives of governments — each seat to be oc-
cupied by a representative of a world region.16 Arguably, the 
governments are the effective representatives of the people.17  
Each of the other representations will be selected by a particu-
lar powerful constituency. One reason for the change seems to 
be ICANN’s management’s concern with ICANN’s financing. 
Specifically, the management desired to finance the expansion 
of ICANN’s activities and its staff. The governments will fi-
nance, but obtain a stronger voice in ICANN’s governing body. 
It seems that the European Union will also gain ICANN’s sup-
port for its new country code top-level domain name (“ccTLD”), 
“.eu,” as an exception to the practice that only United Nations-
recognized countries be awarded this type of name. Thus, the 
potential competitors of ICANN joined it and presumably 
would compete or negotiate inside rather than outside the or-
ganization. A consensus among the constituents will make 
ICANN a very strong monopoly because the ranks of the con-
straining outside forces will dwindle. That development may 
ultimately pose a danger to the integrity of the Internet. A 
strong and authoritarian ICANN may become a true regulator 
that departs from the spirit and loose structure of the Internet. 
That may press dissidents to combine, build and offer an alter-
native, which is technically feasible even today. Today, such an 
  
 15. See PRESIDENT’S REPORT, supra note 7. 
 16. Id.  
 17. Governments were excluded from the board under the current struc-
ture. They did, however, participate as an advisory committee. The proposed 
restructure would include government representatives as directors. 
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alternative does not draw members of the infrastructure. If 
ICANN tightens the reins sufficiently to strengthen the dissi-
dents, an alternative will gain followers, or the dissidents may 
gain control, “capture” ICANN, and the experiment will con-
tinue.  
A less prominent aspect of the contestable markets theory is 
the interest of all competing parties in maintaining a viable 
market. If competition drives the consumers away altogether, 
or destroys the market structure, the competitors have nothing 
to compete for.18 One of the main objectives of the parties inter-
ested in the Internet is to ensure a thriving Internet. Control 
by itself is insufficient unless the Internet is preserved. The 
binding force of all parties today is the belief that the Internet 
will not survive unless it has a single root. Parties with a stake 
in the continued operation of the Internet are very reluctant to 
enter into a competing structure that may endanger the Inter-
net’s inter-operability. This is the glue that holds all partici-
pants together. On this issue the rule of consensus is impera-
tive. But if a new technology develops in which one or more 
alternative roots do not disrupt the smooth operation of the 
Internet, then ICANN’s power will become meaningless or far 
weaker than its controllers currently aim. They will then grasp 
at nothing, just as they cannot grasp today at some parts of the 
Internet’s infrastructure that are not dependent on the single 
root concept. Even though the probability that this alternative 
will be effective seems very low, its effect is drastic. Therefore, 
pressure to develop and build alternatives to the single root 
may be another constraining element in the Internet power 
market.  
This Article concludes that ICANN’s power is still being 
shaped. It could emerge along a market model, as a central 
catalyst for consensus building among parties with different 
interests. ICANN would address problems as they arise. This 
model would also be closer to the model that the technical 
community follows, although money is not its mover. In a pre-
vious draft of this Article, I suggested that “[a]lternatively, 
ICANN could also move towards a more regulatory model 
  
 18. Thus, competitors will not use violence to compete (plant bombs at 
each other’s shops) because the marketplace becomes too dangerous to visit 
and consumers will avoid all shops.  
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based on the consensus of powerful constituencies who have a 
significant stake in ICANN.” It seems that the current restruc-
turing attempt of ICANN’s management moves toward this 
model. Or ICANN can combine the two models to form a more 
structured market and more flexible regulatory body. Or none 
of these governance models would make a difference. A new 
ICANN, an alternative system or no system may rise by a 
technology that is today a mere twinkle in someone’s eye.    
II. A PUZZLE: HOW CAN A NATURAL MONOPOLY BE WEAK?  
A. ICANN Manages a Hierarchical System that Is a Natural 
Monopoly  
As everyone knows, the Internet can be viewed as a network 
of networks free of central control and led by an “invisible 
hand.” That is true to an extent, just as markets can be viewed 
as interactions among individuals and groups free of central 
control. To this extent, both systems are led by an invisible 
hand. Both, however, cannot function without an infrastruc-
ture.19 Put in biblical terms, without a common language, both 
systems can become a dysfunctional Tower of Babel. The cur-
rent Internet network structure requires that each receiver and 
sender of messages will have a unique one-of-a-kind designa-
tion, and that each computer message will have a unique num-
ber so that the “packages” of transported information will reach 
their destination.20 The design further requires that transmis-
sions be governed by acceptable protocols. If receivers, senders 
or spaces do not have unique designations and if the actors 
serving as the infrastructure do not follow the protocols, mes-
sages will miss their destinations. The Internet will become the 
Tower of Babel.21  
  
 19. See Tamar Frankel, The Legal Infrastructure of Markets: The Role of 
Contract and Property Law, 73 B.U. L. REV. 389 (1993). 
 20. See, e.g., Milton Mueller, Technology and Institutional Innovation: 
Internet Domain Names, 5 INT’L J. COMM. L. & POL’Y 1 (2000), available at 
LEXIS, Lawrev Library, Allrev File. 
 21. See INTERNET ARCHITECTURE BOARD, TECHNICAL COMMENT ON THE 
UNIQUE DNS ROOT (1999), at http://www.icann.org/correspondence/iab-tech-
comment-27sept99.htm (stating that information emphasizing the current 
one root should remain intact to avoid confusion within the Internet commu-
nity); James Middleton, Icann Tackles “Alternative” Domain Names, 
VNUNET.COM (June 1, 2001), at http://www.vnunet.com/News/1122310 (The 
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1. The Feudal Structure of the Naming and Numbering System 
With a view to preventing chaos and ensuring stability, the 
Internet naming and numbering system was designed in a hi-
erarchical mode. Each level contains a signifier, under which 
names and numbers within its sphere of influence are recorded. 
The single root or dot (“.”) is in fact a database for two letter 
country code domain names such as “.uk” (United Kingdom) or 
“.fr” (France). The single root zone also contains generic top-
level domain names (“gTLDs”), such as “.com,” “.org,” “.gov” 
and “.edu.”22 That system ensures, for example, that no other 
“.edu” exists. Listed under the “.edu” umbrella are Boston Uni-
versity and other educational institutions. No other Boston 
University can be listed. Under the name of each institution, 
other lower level domain names can be listed and managed, 
such as “tfrankel.” No other “tfrankel” can be listed. 
There is a general belief that the inter-connectivity of the 
Internet depends on the integrity and maintenance of this hi-
erarchical structure, and that unless the message senders and 
transferors comply with the same rules, or protocols, confusion 
will reign. Hence, like market standards of weights and meas-
ures and prohibitions on fraud, the Internet is governed by a 
structure of names, numbers and protocols.23  
  
author notes “rogue domains” and that “ICANN plans to set up an oversight 
panel to take a firm stance against the alternative movement, claiming that 
there are ‘solid technical grounds for a single authoritative root.’”). The report 
describes the arguments and explanations for the emergence of these rogue 
alternative roots. See InterNIC, The Domain Name System: A Non-Technical 
Explanation — Why Universal Resolvability Is Important, at 
http://www.internic.net/faqs/authoritative-dns.html (last visited Apr. 21, 
2002).  
 22. JON POSTEL, DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM STRUCTURE AND DELEGATION 1  
(1994), at ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc1591.txt (describing the domain name 
system). On the arguments on whether new gTLDs should be added, see 
ICANN, REPORT (PART ONE) OF WORKING GROUP C (NEW GTLDS) PRESENTED 
TO NAMES COUNCIL (2000), at http://www.icann.org/dnso/wgc-report-
21mar00.htm; ICANN, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT TO NAMES COUNCIL 
CONCERNING WORKING GROUP C (2000), at http://www.icann.org/dnso/wgc-
supp-report-17apr00.htm; ICANN, CONSIDERATION OF INTRODUCING NEW 
GENERIC TOP-LEVEL DOMAINS (2000), at http://www.icann.org/dnso/gtld-topic-
20apr00.htm. 
 23. To be sure, there are networks, and very large networks, that have 
different names, numbers and protocols. But if they are to interconnect with 
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The intermediaries that form the Internet infrastructure are 
the ISPs, registries and registrars. ISPs receive and transfer 
messages usually to other ISPs and through them to the final 
destination.24 Registries manage the database of the names 
under their umbrella in the pyramid. Thus, the “root registry” 
registers the ccTLDs and gTLDs.25 Registries manage and pub-
lish the zone files of ccTLDs and gTLDs. Registrars manage 
names under specific gTLDs. The current uniform practice 
among the large ISPs is to follow the single root structure. 
Some people question the necessity of one root and maintain 
that dual roots will not necessarily disrupt the connectivity of 
the Internet.26 But no one has made a serious attempt to ex-
periment with two roots for fear of disrupting the smooth op-
eration of the Internet.  
2. The Power of Bestowing Internet Names and Numbers 
An Internet “domain name” differs in value and function 
from a name in real space.27 A domain name is the spark that 
breathes life and the very existence on the Internet. The loss of 
a name on the Internet is death without a trace. In fact, when 
reassigned, the name breathes life into another being. Our 
Internet names must be unique to us. More than in real space, 
the Internet name system deprives us of the freedom to use the 
names allocated to others. While in real space people with the 
same name can be distinguished by other means, on the Inter-
net there is little distinguishing information about people. 
  
the global network, they must fit within the naming, numbering and proto-
cols of the global Internet. 
 24. In addition, there are services that do not actually transfer the mes-
sages but facilitate the search for particular sites on the Internet, such as 
America Online.   
 25. DOMAIN NAME SERVICES ORGANIZATION , ROOT LEVEL REGISTRY RULES, 
THE MANNER OF ADDING NEW GTLDS TO THE INTERNET (1999), at 
http://www.dnso.net/mhsc-tld.htm (“The function of the root registry is to 
register and advertise TLDs.”). 
 26. See Kieren McCarthy, The Insider’s Guide to the ICANN Meeting, 
REGISTER (Sept. 21, 2001), at http://theregister.co.uk/content/6/21533.html 
(noting that “some within ICANN” have supported multiple roots).  
 27. See Tamar Frankel, The Common Law and Cyberspace (2001) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with Journal). 
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Names are the only means of recognition.28 Therefore, name 
allocation and withdrawal can be a source of power and wealth.  
Like the naming system, the management of the system is 
hierarchical, and so is the power to allocate names. Since all 
names derive from one source, that source reigns supreme, and 
like the vassals in the feudal system, each vassal source de-
rives its power from the lord above it, until it reaches the pin-
nacle — the king. That king is ICANN.      
3. Enter ICANN 
ICANN was established to achieve a number of objectives. 
The foremost objective was to ensure the Internet stability and 
expand its capacity. ICANN was also required to increase the 
number of gTLDs and registries, to facilitate competition 
among them,29 and to help establish a dispute settlement 
mechanism between holders of domain names and holders of 
registered trademarks.30 The precise nature of ICANN’s au-
thority was not spelled out. Some viewed it as a forum for de-
  
 28. Because short names help memory, they are in short supply. Although 
we view the Internet as a source of new and more information, often the de-
tails are lost on Internet communications. For example, we can receive in-
formation quickly from all over the globe. But information about the senders 
and receivers is more limited than in face-to-face or even telephone interac-
tion. As one dog in front of the computer says to another in a cartoon in the 
New Yorker: “On the Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog.” Peter Steiner, 
NEW YORKER, July 5, 1993, at 61, 61.  
 29. See ICANN Announces Decision on .com/.net/.org Domains, 
COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW ., June 2001, at 31 (describing the revised agree-
ment between ICANN and the registry of “.com,” “.org” and “.net,” that 
VeriSign had acquired the registry and that Network Solutions, Inc. has been 
split, thus facilitating competition on the registry level); Sandra Dillich, Net-
work Solutions Loses .com, .net and .org, COMPUTER DEALER NEWS, Feb. 25, 
2000, at 42 (describing the negotiations that led to the agreement, and the 
history and summary of the agreement). 
 30. See ICANN Watch, ICANN for Beginners, at 
http://www.icannwatch.org/icann4beginners.php (last visited Apr. 21, 2002); 
Improvement of Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 
Fed. Reg. 8826 (Feb. 20, 1998) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. ch. 13) (proposing a 
rule to improve the management of the Internet Domain Name System, and 
describing the infrastructure of the Internet). This rule was not passed. In-
stead, the DOC issued a Statement of Policy in the form of a White Paper, 
which stated the main objectives contained in the proposed rule.  See Man-
agement of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741 (June 10, 
1998). 
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veloping policy by building a consensus. Some viewed it as a far 
more proactive manager of a technology-based market, de-
signed to monitor and evaluate the infrastructure actors of the 
naming and numbering system and its performance, as well as 
to prevent transgressions that endanger the system.  
ICANN’s lawmaking functions include allocation and regula-
tion of some, though not all, lucrative infrastructure services, 
such as the registries and registrars,31 and setting the qualifi-
cations of these actors.32 ICANN can therefore create such 
businesses and limit entry into such businesses. Unlike gov-
ernments, ICANN’s mission is limited to its enterprise. The 
enterprise, however, affects many areas of human lives — 
business, culture, politics, community, public morals and pri-
vate rights. Its reach is global. In that sense as well, ICANN is 
a lawmaker. 
ICANN’s structure is unique, and I may say, unwieldy. It 
consists of a board, a president and staff, and three “supporting 
organizations,” the most problematic of which is the Domain 
Name Supporting Organization (“DNSO”).33 Each organization 
nominates three board members, while nine board members 
are elected by users. Elections by millions of people over the 
globe have not yet been achieved. ICANN’s processes required 
  
 31. See Dillich, supra note 29 (noting that registry services “became a 
huge revenue maker”). As to ISPs, aside from contracting with Regional 
Internet Registries for some policy-making intellectual property address 
block allocation, which involves little policy making, there are no qualifica-
tions or other regulation of ISPs. 
 32. See Saroja Ginshankar, Internet Domain Name Registry Up for Bids, 
INTERNETWEEK, Feb. 15, 1999, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File. The 
monitoring and evaluation is to be determined by a committee of third par-
ties. See ICANN, PRELIMINARY REPORT, MEETING OF THE ICANN BOARD IN 
STOCKHOLM (2001), at http://www.icann.org/minutes/prelim-report-
04jun01.htm (“Whereas in resolution 01.60, the [ICANN] Board directed ‘the 
President to prepare and present to the Board . . . a proposal to form a com-
mittee to recommend processes for monitoring the implementation of the new 
TLDs and evaluating the new TLD program, including any ongoing adjust-
ments of agreements with operators or sponsors of new TLDs.’”). 
 33. ICANN, Domain Name Supporting Organization (DNSO), at  
http://www.icann.org/dnso/dnso.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2002).  The DNSO 
structure does not contain a working group which deals with issues concern-
ing the ccTLDs. For a chart of the ICANN organization, see ICANN Watch, 
The ICANN-GAC Organization, at http://www.icannwatch.org/archive/ 
orgchart.gif (last visited Apr. 21, 2002) (ICANN organization chart by Tony 
Rutkowski). 
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transparency and public participation. This requirement has 
not been entirely met. Further, it is unclear whether ICANN 
was expected to establish policies or merely to approve policies 
established by its three supporting organizations. The DNSO 
did not succeed in reaching a consensus on proposed policies.34 
In its proposal to restructure ICANN, the staff has declared the 
current structure and constraints a failure, and proposed to 
simplify the structure.35 Five directors representing the gov-
ernments of each global region would substitute for the nine 
publicly elected directors. No review panel would be estab-
lished to determine the board’s policy authority. ICANN will 
move towards a corporate model of the traditional not-for-profit 
corporation vintage.  
B. ICANN Emerged as a Weak Monopoly Because of the Cir-
cumstances Surrounding Its Creation 
Two views explain the creation of ICANN. One view de-
scribes ICANN’s creation as the expression of a consensus on a 
specific agenda among parties with different interests and 
views.36 The other view on the creation of ICANN is also con-
sensus-based.37 But the consensus was about something else. 
The interested parties, such as the technical communities, the 
large business interests, Network Solutions, Inc. (“NSI”) (that 
managed the root zone and the gTLDs “.com,” “.net” and “.org”), 
the various governments, the large ISPs, the small ISPs and 
the small businesses that use the Internet, had very different 
  
 34. See infra Part III.B.4. describing the disaffection of the ccTLD regis-
tries. 
 35. See PRESIDENT’S REPORT, supra note 7. 
 36. In 1998, prior to ICANN’s creation, the author chaired meetings enti-
tled the International Forum on the White Paper.  These meetings were held 
in Reston, Virginia, on July 1-2, 1998; Geneva, Switzerland, on July 24-25, 
1998; Singapore, on August 11-13, 1998; and Buenos Aires, Argentina, on 
August 20-21, 1998.  The author spoke to the group in Buenos Aires but did 
not chair that meeting.  The participants represented many different stake-
holders.  The purpose of the meetings was to reach a rough consensus regard-
ing the structure, governance and participation of the company that was to 
take over the management of the naming and numbering system of the 
Internet.  The consensus achieved in these meetings contributed to the estab-
lishment of ICANN.  See Domain Name Handbook, International Forum on 
the White Paper (IFWP), at http://www.domainhandbook.com/ifwp.html (last 
visited Apr. 20, 2002).  
 37. Id. 
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views of what the Internet infrastructure should be and how it 
should be managed. Most importantly, they disagreed on who 
should have the power to manage the naming system. They 
were also very concerned about the possible “capture” of the 
naming and numbering system by one interest group. There-
fore, their consensus on the issues was reached at a very high 
level of generality. The devil of the details was left to be re-
solved.       
1. Power by Default: “I Will Not Claim Control if You Do Not 
Claim Control”38 
A review of ICANN’s creation and emerging power suggests 
that different interest groups agreed not to claim control if eve-
ryone else would not claim control of the naming and number-
ing system. ICANN’s power was therefore created by default. 
No one interest group has agreed to put another interest group 
on the throne to manage and regulate the infrastructure of the 
Internet, and each group was anxious about capture by an-
other.  
There were many candidates for the job: (1) the United 
States and other governments; (2) the established technical 
communities headed by Dr. Jon Postel, who designed the sys-
tem and managed it for over twenty years; (3) the large busi-
nesses; (4) the professionals who sought to participate in the 
infrastructure for profit; (5) people who claimed to represent 
the consumers or users; and (6) international communication 
organizations.  
The United States, which triggered the emergence of the 
Internet, and the U.S. administration, which exercised the 
management power over the Internet naming and numbering 
system, did not seek to continue its hegemony. The administra-
tion was hard pressed by a number of countries to de-
Americanize the Internet. Other difficult political issues have 
arisen that the U.S. wished to avoid. For example, how to de-
fine a country entitled to a ccTLD, and how to convert into 
competition the monopoly position of registries, notably NSI 
(now VeriSign), that managed “.com,” “.org” and “.net.” The 
U.S. administration was not interested in mediating disputes 
  
 38. Id. 
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between the business communities and the technical communi-
ties, since the solutions involved costs in dollars and time.  
The U.S. administration was ready to offer the Internet to 
the world, but with strings attached. To de-Americanize the 
management and regulation of the Internet infrastructure 
without severing its American umbilical cord, the administra-
tion considered different avenues. Since the interested groups 
did not reach a consensus, the administration conducted meet-
ings and produced a policy paper that seemed, at a high level, 
to represent a consensus not only between the U.S. groups, but 
also with foreign governments.39  
While different governments demanded the de-
Americanization of the Internet, none claimed to be the sole 
governor of the Internet infrastructure. It was recognized that 
none would succeed in realizing such a demand, and the only 
country which in fact controlled the infrastructure, namely the 
U.S., was unlikely to relinquish control to another country. 
Neither was the UN an acceptable alternative. Control over the 
Internet infrastructure required a nimble guiding management 
and sensitive rulemaking. The UN and its various organiza-
tions were considered too slow and inflexible to respond to the 
kaleidoscopic, fast-changing demands of the Internet.   
The technical community, especially the Internet Assigned 
Numbers Authority (“IANA”), led by Dr. Postel, was a natural 
candidate for the management of the infrastructure of the 
Internet. It had been managing the infrastructure since the 
Internet’s inception. Many members of the communities were 
in fact the ISPs and registries. They also commanded support 
of some European governments. These communities wanted to 
undertake the management and regulatory function. However, 
the U.S. business community and NSI did not agree to a trans-
fer of control to the technical communities, and demanded a 
voice, even a decisive voice, in decisions concerning the Inter-
net infrastructure. Therefore, a compromise between these two 
interest groups and their different visions of the Internet had 
to be reached before a private corporation could be established. 
The conflict between the technical communities and the 
business communities was complicated because many had 
members in each camp. Some “techies” were employed by large 
  
 39. Id. 
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business organizations such as MCI (now WorldCom, Inc.), 
AT&T Corp. and IBM Corp. These persons were also involved 
in the Internet service providing activities. Thus, not all parts 
of the business communities necessarily objected to influence of 
the technical groups. On the other side of the coin were the reg-
istries, and especially NSI, that were publicly owned and oper-
ated as businesses rather than as volunteer or scientific enter-
prises. Thus, it would be more accurate to describe the conflict 
as a conflict between two philosophies and cultures. The one 
viewed the Internet as a tool for business development or as a 
source of profit from servicing. The other, rejecting the view of 
the Internet as a tool for “making money,” viewed the Internet 
as the product of technological creativity, whose purpose was to 
continue to contribute to science, national society and the 
global community.40  
The small business interests and those who claimed to repre-
sent the users and “net citizens” were not candidates for con-
trolling the infrastructure, but demanded participation in the 
control.41 They, too, were divided. Some aligned with technical 
communities and some with different clusters of interest, but 
many did not align with anyone.  
It was recognized that technical decisions concerning the in-
frastructure could no longer be made by technology criteria 
alone. Political and business consequences of technical deci-
sions mattered. The future body that would guide the infra-
structure of the Internet had to consider all three criteria 
(technical, business and political), mediate among them and 
balance them correctly. This conclusion brought about the idea 
of an entirely new organization to meet the new demands. 
The route to establishing the entity that would manage and 
regulate the Internet infrastructure had to be foggy. The U.S. 
administration wished to avoid “establishing” and “acquiring” a 
private corporation because such a corporation must be estab-
lished under an act of Congress.42 There was concern that if the 
  
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Under federal law, the executive branch may establish and control a 
private sector corporation only under a statute. See Government Corporation 
Control Act of 1945, 31 U.S.C. § 9102 (1994) [hereinafter GCCA]. See also A. 
Michael Froomkin, Reinventing the Government Corporation, 1995 U. ILL. L.  
REV. 543 (1995) [hereinafter Reinventing Government]. Arguably, because the 
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matter came before Congress it might become a problematic 
“political football.” To avoid the required act, the administra-
tion had to avoid the “establishment” or “acquisition” of such a 
corporation. From the point of view of the administration and 
some members of Congress, the solution was to help create a 
private corporation, grounded in market principles, and an 
Internet infrastructure moved by competition. This creation 
would be an entity that no one established, but just came into 
being. In fact, that is the closest description of the emergence of 
ICANN. Not one invisible hand, but many invisible hands, 
brought it about. Had only one hand, as invisible as it might 
have been, propelled the entity into existence, other powerful 
hands would have been raised in protest. The flurry of negotia-
tions, promises, some broken, some re-negotiated or aban-
doned, and alliances formed and reformed brought about an 
equilibrium that allowed the entity to emerge. The driving 
force of the negotiation and consensus seems to have been the 
recognition that no better alternative was available. ICANN 
was therefore born by default.43 
2. ICANN’s Initial Power Was Weak 
In addition to ICANN’s default creation, it was not very pow-
erful either. The circumstances of its birth did not inspire much 
confidence or legitimacy. ICANN had no blessing of an author-
izing statute.44  It did not have the benefit of the invisible hand 
of the free market or the citizens’ votes in a democratic regime. 
In fact, it emerged as a result of negotiations among interest 
groups with the service of go-betweens. Its great leadership 
weakness was the image of secret negotiations, behind the 
  
executive neither “established” nor “acquired” ICANN, the statute did not 
apply to it. ICANN has been operating on the basis of an agreement with the 
DOC. The DOC asserts its authority to enter into such agreements, but ques-
tions persist.    
 43. Congress was merely apprised of the emergence of ICANN. The ccTLD 
registries are currently paying ICANN a fee for services that they used to 
receive free from the U.S. government. It was suggested that they are willing 
to do so in order to “pry the Internet naming system from the U.S. govern-
ment.”  Revolt Threatens ICANN’s Budget, USA TODAY (Nov. 20, 2000), at 
http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/cti821.htm.  
 44. Under federal law, the executive branch may establish and control a 
private sector corporation only under a statute. See GCCA, 31 U.S.C. § 9102. 
See also Wrong Turn, supra note 8, at 22-23. 
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scenes agreements, and mistrust of “outsiders.” Mistrust 
breeds mistrust.      
In addition, ICANN’s mandate was general. Some of its mis-
sions posed conflicts between technological, business and politi-
cal views. ICANN was required to establish additional gTLDs. 
But the largest corporations with the most famous brand 
names objected to any such addition because it imposed heavy 
costs on them in protecting their trademarks.45 ICANN was 
required to create competition among registries, and especially 
to break up NSI’s monopoly. Yet that monopoly was in part 
based on the infrastructure of the Internet that required regis-
tries to maintain a central database to avoid duplications of the 
names and the numbers. In addition, the “ownership” or other 
form of entitlement of the names and the databases was not 
established. To create competition among registries and regis-
trars required portability of the names, and demand for names 
coupled with the vision of a free market in the names gave the 
names the features of property with attendant unanticipated 
consequences, such as cybersquatting. Thus, ICANN’s man-
agement decisions could have far reaching consequences, and 
at the same time conflict with the desires of one or more of its 
supporting interest groups. 
ICANN received the mantle of Dr. Postel as the manager of 
the naming and numbering system. But not quite.  It did not 
have his authority nor the adoration of his followers, which had 
grown with twenty-five years of devoted service and good 
judgment. It did, however, have a contract with the DOC, but a 
conditional contract at that.46 To become fully vested with the 
powers of the United States (whatever these are) over the sys-
tems, ICANN had to meet additional conditions under a certain 
deadline.47 These involved the heart of its control structure — 
  
 45. See Reinventing Government, supra note 42, at 547. 
 46. Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Department of 
Commerce and Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (n.d.), 
available at http://www.icann.org/general/icann-mou-25nov98.htm (last up-
dated Dec. 31, 1999). 
 47. ICANN did not meet the requirements of the DOC and was therefore 
not fully vested with the authority over the root. However, the DOC has 
averred its intention to make the transfer, and retreated from a clear intent. 
The question of ICANN’s legal status was discussed in a General Accounting 
Office report of 2000. See OFFICE OF THE GE N. COUNSEL, U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE , DEP’T OF COMMERCE : RELATIONSHIP WITH THE INTERNET 
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public participation in its decision making and in its board. 
These conditions were precisely the ones that some of ICANN’s 
promoters rejected. Elections are antithetical to self-
perpetuating boards. Elections endanger the position of the 
existing controlling group and open the doors to capture of the 
institution.   
In sum, when ICANN emerged, its mission and power were 
not clearly defined. Its strength lay in the lack of better alter-
natives. ICANN’s power was strengthened at the outset by the 
highly reputable persons who populated its first board, and by 
a dedicated expert staff with significant knowledge of the 
Internet, its organizations and its history. This knowledge 
complemented the expertise of the board members. Needless to 
say, ICANN was not strong. The world sat back, folded its 
arms, and took a wait-and-see attitude.  ICANN was not pow-
erless, however. It was backed by a number of power centers: 
(1) the technical communities; (2) the large business communi-
ties, including the large ISPs; (3) NSI; and (4) the involved gov-
ernments. This was ICANN’s power base, and it was quite 
broad.48         
III. PUZZLE: HOW DOES A WEAK MONOPOLY AUGMENT ITS 
POWER? 
A. Consolidating the Power 
1. Constitutional Documents: The Articles and Bylaws 
ICANN’s articles of incorporation and bylaws have the poten-
tial of providing the entity with significant power.49 However, 
the entity’s structure is also very complex, and the division of 
power among the different groups, such as the board on the one 
hand and the supporting organizations on the other hand, is 
not spelled out in the document. That is also because there was 
no clear consensus on the division of the power. Supporting 
  
CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS  (2000), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/0g00033r.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. 
 48. This power base did not include recognized consumer representatives, 
except to the extent that national governments may be deemed to represent 
the interests of their citizens and residents. 
 49. See ICANN, BYLAWS (2002), available at http://www.icann.org/general/ 
bylaws.htm; ARTS. OF INCORPORATION, supra note 6. 
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organizations could designate their candidates to the board and 
could propose policies to the board. Although it seems to have 
been the consensus that the board could not reject the candi-
dates, it was not clear whether the board had to accept the pol-
icy proposals and whether the board could initiate its own pro-
posals. It was also not clear whether initiation would be limited 
to non-technical policies, and whether one could distinguish 
between technical, political and business considerations. Thus, 
the vagueness of the documents could provide ICANN with 
power, or rob it of power, depending on the implementation of 
its policies and solutions to the problems with which it would 
be presented. 
2. The Contracts with Internet Service Providers and           
Registries 
An important part of ICANN’s power base is grounded in the 
contracts that ICANN negotiated with the Internet infrastruc-
ture operators, the registries and registrars. These contracts 
should rightly be added as part of ICANN’s constitution. Said 
ICANN’s President, Mike Roberts: “ICANN had to take the 
very informal handshake world of [Internet founder] Jon Postel 
and turn that into language that can be written down and form 
the basis of a legal arrangement.”50 ICANN sought to formalize 
its relationship with the government, the registries and the 
service providers through the mechanism of contracts.51  
The contracts contain features that empower ICANN. For 
example, the parties to the contract are obligated to abide by 
ICANN’s policies if these policies command consensus. A re-
view board (to be established) has the authority to make a find-
ing of the existence or absence of a consensus. The importance 
of these contracts cannot be exaggerated (because the defini-
tion of policy decision is vague). Thus, so long as ICANN’s pol-
  
 50. Maureen Sirhal, Net Governance: ICANN Makes Progress on Sticky 
Issue of Domains, NAT’L J. TECH. DAILY, Feb. 6, 2001, LEXIS, News Library, 
News Group File [hereinafter Sticky Issues].  Such agreements have not yet 
materialized with most registries, let alone been standardized. See Maureen 
Sirhal, Net Governance: European Domains Want ICANN’s Attention, NAT’L 
J. TECH. DAILY, Dec. 7, 2000, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File [herein-
after European Domains Want ICANN’s Attention].  
 51. See Mark Sableman, ICANN Faces Major Challenge with Country 
Codes, NAT ’L L.J., Dec. 18, 2000, at C10. 
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icy decisions command a consensus they are binding on the 
signatories of the contracts, that is, on the actors in the Inter-
net infrastructure.52  
Some economists have suggested the use of contracts as a re-
sponse to the failures of the contestable markets theory, espe-
cially in the deregulation period. “The ultimate objective is to 
replace transitory regulation with the contracts that would 
have been in effect had they not been superseded by regulatory 
institutions.”53 Therefore, lawmakers should negotiate laws in 
the market, and pass laws that are as close as possible to the 
negotiated result had there been a market. The visible regula-
tors’ hand should be led by the visible hand of the parties. The 
contestable market theory and the use of contracts are pro-
posed as alternatives to heavy-handed inefficient government 
regulation. ICANN is using contracts as a negotiated regula-
tory device.54     
3. General Support for ICANN’s Prime Directive: To Maintain 
the Stability of the Internet 
ICANN’s primary directive has had the support of many, if 
not all, powerful stakeholders. Both governments and busi-
nesses that invest millions in Internet commerce and in 
persuading their customers to use this new medium put a high 
premium on stability and operability of the Internet. Blackouts 
and other mishaps, even short lived, can cause heavy losses 
and terminate client relationships.  
The prime directive of ICANN could be interpreted in differ-
ent ways, some of which allow for more flexibility and experi-
mentation than others. Many questions can be differently de-
termined depending on this interpretation. For example, does 
stability require one root at all costs? Can a multitude of roots 
  
 52. In the proposed restructure of ICANN, the review board is eliminated. 
Conflict on whether a policy commands consensus is then likely to be deter-
mined among the parties, a court or other mechanism which the parties will 
establish at the time of dispute.   
 53. TYE, supra note 14, at 121 (suggesting that contracts can be viewed as 
an extension of the Coase theorem). 
 54. See David Johnson & David Post, And How Shall the Net Be Gov-
erned?: A Meditation on the Relative Virtues of Decentralized, Emergent Law, 
in COORDINATING THE INTERNET 62 (Brian Kahin & James H. Keller eds., 
1997). 
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be designed in a way that would support stability and in-
creased scope? Should experiments at the fringe of the Internet 
be encouraged, and if so, how can they be implemented once 
proven not to endanger the stability? Should these experiments 
be left to the regulation of the market? If experiments are al-
lowed, to what extent, if any, should enterprises that invested 
heavily in existing technology and structure have control over 
these experiments? Should these issues be raised now, or 
should they be raised when the existing structure is well estab-
lished? Or, should they be raised when the experiments are 
launched, or when problems arise? 
With respect to stability of the Internet, ICANN has taken a 
conservative attitude, in line with the interpretation of its 
stakeholders and many governments. It sought to standardize 
the Internet infrastructure. This interpretation strengthens 
ICANN’s power. One root creates a natural monopoly that, by 
definition, vests decision and lawmaking power in the manager 
of the system. Any additional root weakens or completely un-
dermines this power. So long as the main stakeholders view the 
prime directive as crucial to their own interests, ICANN must 
be endowed with sufficient power to implement this prime ob-
jective. That was and has remained a significant basis of 
ICANN’s power.  
4. Indirect Help From Congress 
I believe that even though some members of Congress would 
have preferred to deal with Internet governance by legislation 
rather than mere monitoring, most members of the House of 
Representatives committees that dealt with the Internet were 
willing to take the “wait-and-see” attitude towards ICANN.55 
However, whether unwittingly or by design, Congress has also 
helped ICANN perform a task that seemed impossibly con-
flicted: creating additional gTLDs and facilitating greater com-
petition among registries. The task met strong opposition from 
a large, important stakeholder constituency of ICANN: the 
owners of famous trademarks.56 These stakeholders have been 
  
 55. The doubts about the legality of ICANN persisted, and Congress re-
quested the General Accounting Office to inquire how ICANN came into exis-
tence. See GAO REPORT, supra note 47, at 1. 
 56. See Wrong Turn, supra note 8, at 22-23. 
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protecting their trademarks at great cost, and additional 
gTLDs could increase these costs because each new gTLD can 
breed trademark violations under its cap.   
Congress responded to the trademark owners in a way that 
reduced their objections to additional gTLDs. Congress passed 
a law to protect famous trademarks from dilution.57 This was a 
fundamental change in trademark law, which was based on 
protection of consumers from confusion. In addition, ICANN 
established an option of less expensive resolution of disputes 
between trademark owners and domain name owners. The new 
statute and the less costly process by which trademark owners 
could protect their trademarks against competing domain 
names reduced the objection of the large corporations to the 
creation of new gTLDs.  
In addition, congressional monitoring has helped ICANN by 
offering accurate information, criticism and a sense of the lim-
its on ICANN’s actions. For example, when ICANN proposed to 
levy a $1 charge on all registrars world-wide for every domain 
name registration, the protest, which was aired also in Con-
gress, caused ICANN to back off.58 Some would consider this a 
failure. I consider this event a success. Congress helps ICANN 
evaluate its trial and error attempts at expanding its power.   
5. Help From the Courts 
A recent decision regarding a domain name indirectly sup-
ports ICANN’s power.59 This case involves a claim by a national 
government. The government of South Africa sued an Ameri-
can enterprise that used the words “South Africa” in its domain 
names.60 The government of South Africa maintained that the 
name is its property.61 The District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York denied jurisdiction and referred the parties to 
arbitration in accordance with ICANN’s procedures.62 The deci-
  
 57. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-113, §§ 
3001-3010, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-521 to -552 (1999) (codified in scattered 
sections of 15, 16 & 28 U.S.C.). 
 58. See Sableman, supra note 51.  
 59. See Virtual Countries, Inc. v. Republic of South Africa, 148 F. Supp. 2d 
256 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 60. Id. at 259. 
 61. Id.  
 62. Id. at 268. 
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sion indirectly supports ICANN’s power. Courts are unlikely to 
entertain claims of sovereign powers to ccTLDs, and the issue 
is designed to be resolved in accordance with the process estab-
lished by ICANN. It is unlikely that any and all uses of a 
state’s name will be barred by the arbitration tribunal. Thus, 
ICANN will be freed of making difficult decisions. It seems that 
the government of South Africa and some other governments 
have determined to protect their names by internal legisla-
tion.63 This approach as well relieves ICANN from the burden 
of determining the issue and exposing a weakness if it cannot 
implement its decision. 
6. Mediation and Negotiations with and Among Stakeholders 
ICANN has chosen appropriate methods for consolidating 
power. Before decisions were made public, the governments 
and other large stakeholders were consulted and a consensus 
was obtained. Only then would the results be published. Fur-
ther, ICANN has not always insisted on exerting authority. It 
deals with powerful constituencies by negotiation rather than 
ruling. However, every agreement with any such constituency 
helps build precedents for agreements with others, thereby 
helping to establish future customary rules. Moreover, when a 
conflict arose among powerful stakeholders, ICANN was often 
inclined to play the role of a mediator rather than an arbitra-
tor. It has provided an effective forum for negotiation and a 
face-saving intermediary service. That increased its value to 
those participants. Repeat requests to ICANN augmented its 
power.     
However, consensus-building negotiations make it harder to 
gain public support and broad leadership. The process is far 
from public and the method limits ICANN’s freedom to factor 
in public comments. Therefore, the solicitation of public com-
ments and input seems to be a sham.  To some extent it is. 
That may explain why ICANN’s power rests primarily on its 
constituencies and far less on public support and leadership.   
  
 63. See Bill on Internet Due Soon, AFRICA NEWS, Oct. 4, 2001, LEXIS, 
News Library, News Group File; Cyber Cops to Ensure Safe Surfing, AFRICA 
NEWS, Mar. 22, 2002, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File (noting that 
the bill was tabled in March 2002). 
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B. Demonstrating ICANN’s Rising Power 
Recent events concerning ccTLDs demonstrate that ICANN’s 
power is on the rise. ICANN’s interaction with ccTLD registries 
has increased in recent years. The context and substance of 
these interactions differ, but all indicate the nature and level of 
ICANN’s power.  
1. Country Code Top–Level Domain Names  
ccTLDs are two-letter names designed to inform about the 
physical location of name holders. They are on the same level 
as gTLDs. With the rise of the value of gTLDs, such as “.com,” 
the value of ccTLDs has risen as well. That is because under a 
ccTLD, one can create many new (and sometimes known) 
gTLDs under its umbrella. ccTLDs are similar to TLDs except 
that they are limited to existing political real entities (coun-
tries), regardless of how we define them.64  
When the value and importance of names and their man-
agement was not accompanied by political or economic values, 
ccTLDs and their registries — delegates of the power to man-
age the database of the domain names under their authority — 
were recognized generously.65 For example, IANA, which pre-
ceded ICANN, recognized the delegation of a ccTLD to Pales-
tine, and thereafter confirmed a reassignment of the delegation 
to other registries.66  
  
 64. The argument of whether a country can assert exclusive right to its 
name was raised in a United States court. See Virtual Countries, 148 F. 
Supp. 2d at 256. The district court did not assert jurisdiction and suggested 
that the parties resort to the international arbitration system provided for 
disputes concerning domain names. Id. at 268. 
 65. See JOHN C. KLENSIN, INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE , 
REFLECTIONS ON THE DNS, RFC 1591, AND CATEGORIES OF DOMAINS  (2000), at 
http://public.research.mimesweeper.com/standards/IETF/Draft/draft-klensin-
1591-reflections -02.txt (describing ccTLDs and gTLDs and the controversies 
involving their delegation). 
 66. To avoid making a political decision, IANA followed a list by ISO 3166 
Maintenance Agency, and agreed to the re-delegation of Palestine when Pal-
estine was accorded the status of “Occupied Palestine Territory.” IANA, 
IANA REPORT ON REQUEST FOR DELEGATION OF THE .PS TOP LEVEL DOMAIN 
(2000), at http://www.icann.org/general/ps-report-22mar00.htm (containing 
IANA’s report and analysis which led to the recommendation to approve the 
re-delegation). See also International Organization for Standardization, ISO 
3166 Maintenance Agency (ISO 3166/MA), at 
http://www.din.de/gremien/nas/nabd/iso3166ma (last visited Apr. 20, 2002) 
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The use of ccTLDs varies. In some countries, they are used as 
gTLDs that have a similar name as the country’s name. In 
other countries, they represent a political geography.67 Some 
countries have privatized (sold) their ccTLDs, as the U.S. gov-
ernment is considering doing.68 Other countries deem the regis-
tries of ccTLDs to be the delegates of the governments and un-
der their control. 
2. The Dispute over ccTLD “.au” Between the Registry and the 
Australian Government 
In 1986, Professor Robert Elz received from Dr. Postel the 
delegated authority over the registry of Australia’s ccTLD — 
“.au.” Even though the registry had the power to create second-
level domains, such as “.com.au” and “.net.au,”69 Professor Elz 
seemed to believe that the main Internet services should not be 
commercial.70 No commercial use also meant no value for the 
  
(describing the complete list of country names and ISO 3166-1 Alpha-2 code 
elements — the ISO country code used on the Internet). 
 67. See POSTEL, supra note 22, at 1.  Part of this description has changed 
with the years. The principles, however, remained the same. See ICANN, 
ICP-1: INTERNET DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM STRUCTURE AND DELEGATION (1999), at 
http://www.icann.org/icp/icp-1.htm [hereinafter ICP-1] (describing ICANN’s 
administration practices, and noting that IANA has remained the overall 
authority for day-to-day administration of the naming system, intellectual 
property addresses, autonomous system numbers and TLDs, and other as-
pects of the system). The document includes the source where the “procedures 
to be followed in requesting TLD delegations or changes” can be found. Id.  
The document contains the qualification requirements for TLD managers.  
Id. 
 68. See NAT ’L TELECOMMS. AND INFO. ADMIN., THE DIGITAL OPPORTUNITY 
TRUST: THE DOT  IN .US, at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/ 
usrfc2/comments.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2002) (proposing an elaborate 
plan to manage “.us” for the benefit of all U.S. citizens); Commerce Depart-
ment Poised to Accept Bids for .us, NAT ’L J. TECH. DAILY, June 1, 2001, 
LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.  See also ICANN Watch, More on the 
.us Solicitation, at http://www.icannwatch.org/article.php?sid=208 (June 14, 
2001). 
 69. See Kate Mackenzie, Domains Taken from Elz, AUSTRALIAN, Feb. 5, 
2002, at 29; Multimedia Seeks .au Registry, AUSTRALIAN FI N. REV., Dec. 3, 
2001, at 42 (Professor Elz assigned the “.au” rights to a “commercial spin-off” 
of Melbourne University – Melbourne IT) [hereinafter Domains Taken from 
Elz].   
 70. It seems that Professor Elz controlled more than the database contain-
ing the current domain name holders. See Kirsty Needham, Australian Gov-
ernment to Take Over Domain Names, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Jan. 22, 
 
 4/20/02 9:44:21 AM 
888 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. XXVII:3 
names. Consequently, “Australia has never had a cybersquat-
ting problem like the United States has.”71 No one compiles 
names for sale. 
The government of Australia, however, has different priori-
ties, planning a far more aggressive commercial development of 
the Internet,72 as well as tighter government control over do-
mestic Internet use.73 It established the authority “auDA,”74 
and required Professor Elz to re-delegate the registry’s func-
tions to this authority. The re-delegation of the “.au” space 
would also affect the sub-domains.75 Professor Elz agreed to re-
delegate, but it appeared unlikely that he would do so until 
certain conditions had been met.76 A year later, the re-
delegation had still not taken place.77 On June 13, 2001, a news 
headline stated: Internet’s Reclusive Pioneer Hangs on to Keys 
to Web.78 Interestingly, Professor Elz was deemed not to have 
  
2001, at 35 (noting that the government agency bought a database of all do-
main names registered in Australia). 
 71. Kirsty Needham, Internet’s Reclusive Pioneer Hangs on to Keys to Web, 
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, June 13, 2001, at 25, available at 
http://old.smh.com.au/news/0106/13/biztech/biztech3.html [hereinafter Inter-
net’s Reclusive Pioneer]. 
 72. National Office for the Information Economy, Reforming .au Domain 
Name Administration, at http://www.noie.gov.au/projects/information% 
5Feconomy/domains%5Fau/index.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2002) (The web-
site notes that government recognition of “effective administration of the .au 
domain space” is “important to the development of e-commerce in Austra-
lia.”). 
 73. See ICANN Watch, AUDA Seeks ICANN’s Help to Force .au Redelega-
tion, at http://www.icannwatch.org/article.php?sid=197 (June 6, 2001) [here-
inafter ICANN’s Help] (the Australian authority suggests that Professor Elz’s 
administration had been slow, but did not allege any wrongdoing).   
 74. James Riley, New Board Set Up for Domain Rule, AUSTRALIAN, Apr. 
27, 1999, at 49, 49.   
 75. See Push for Name Controls, AGE (Melbourne), Mar. 7, 2000, at 1 (“The 
policy and administration of the .au domain would affect the sub-domains.”). 
 76. Dot.au Domain Name Registration Gets Nasty, BUS. REV. WEEKLY  
(Australia), May 19, 2000, at 44 (The article states that it was “unlikely Elz 
[would] relinquish his authority until auDA [had] secured the confidence of 
the industry and [was] endorsed by the National Office for the Information 
Economy.”). 
 77. For a precedent by which IANA redelegated a ccTLD of an island of 
forty-nine residents, with the support of all but two of its adult inhabitants, 
see Jeri Clausing, Pacific Islands Seek Control of Internet Designations, N.Y.  
TIMES, Feb. 14, 2000, at C1.  See also Sableman, supra note 51.   
 78. Internet’s Reclusive Pioneer, supra note 71, at 25 (“[Professor Elz] re-
fused to relinquish his historic guardianship, flatly ignoring requests from 
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responded to the government’s request — “just not doing any-
thing” — rather than refused the request.79 The government 
viewed this distinction as “relatively important.”80  In Septem-
ber 2001, ICANN announced that it had awarded control of the 
“.au” domain to auDA.81  However, Elz refused to release the 
“.org.au” and “.id.au” second-level domains, and they were 
seized from him in February 2002.82 
The power relationship between a sovereign country, the reg-
istry of its name and ICANN is unclear. ICANN and IANA 
published the relevant information in 1999,83 yet the power 
relationship is being established by actions rather than by 
words and rules. Arguably, a country should be entitled to its 
own name. But if the name has been assigned by a private body 
and used by a private individual, then presumably it cannot be 
the property of a government.84 The entitlement to the names 
is a subject worthy of a separate paper.85 The important and 
interesting point for the purpose of this Article is the fact that 
the government of Australia approached ICANN for help.86 Af-
  
the Federal Government to pass control of the country’s Internet addressing 
system to a new regulatory body. . . . The clash is one of the last stand-offs 
between the old school of the Internet and the commercial interests that now 
dominate it.”).  
 79. Id.  
 80. Kate Mackenzie, Tough Call on Names for ICANN, AUSTRALIAN, June  
26, 2001, at 33, 33. 
 81. See Kevin Murphy, ICANN Hands .au Domain to Aussie Non-Profit, 
COMPUTER WIRE, Sept. 5, 2001, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File. 
 82. See Domains Taken from Elz, supra note 69, at 29. 
 83. ICP-1, supra note 67.  On transfer and disputes over delegation of 
TLDs, IANA should receive communications from both parties. It takes no 
action until the parties agree, noting that “it is far better when the parties 
can reach an agreement” because of the time it would otherwise take and 
that “it is appropriate for interested parties to have a voice in the selection of 
the designated manager.” Id. 
 84. See Kate Mackenzie, Domain Standoff Tests ICANN, AUSTRALIAN IT 
(June 21, 2001) (on file with Journal) [hereinafter Domain Standoff].  
 85. See id. (suggesting that sovereign countries should have control over 
their names and over the registries, but if the names are used as gTLDs, with 
the consent of the governments, the names should be treated as such).   
 86. See Internet’s Reclusive Pioneer, supra note 71  (The representative of 
the government “has written to the Internet’s governing body, the Interna-
tional [sic] Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, requesting his 
organisation be recognised as the peak Internet body in Australia, not Mr 
Elz.”); Domain Standoff, supra note 84 (noting that such an application is 
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ter all, Professor Elz was an Australian resident and perhaps 
an Australian citizen. The government could have introduced a 
bill that would have required the redelegation. It perhaps could 
have imposed a fine by law or used eminent domain over the 
ccTLD to requisition the name and appoint its own delegate. It 
took none of these steps. Instead it sought ICANN’s interven-
tion in the matter.87 Other countries have taken another route. 
They have asserted their power over the management of their 
ccTLD, and passed laws to give the assertion real teeth.88 
These steps, however, do not weaken ICANN, though they do 
not strengthen it either.  
3. The Rebellion of the ccTLD Registries 
The registries of ccTLDs relate in various ways to the gov-
ernments of the countries to which they provide access, and 
these differences are reflected in relationships between the 
ccTLD registries and ICANN. A number of small countries 
have allowed registries, for a fee, to use their ccTLDs for com-
mercial purposes, like gTLDs.89 These registries act and relate 
  
“virtually unprecedented” in that the delegate is refusing the redelegation 
and that the other application for redelegation involved Pitcairn Island).  
 87. See ICANN’s Help, supra note 73 (administrators of ccTLDs who have 
not been “designated managers” in the database of IANA have sought 
ICANN’s redelegation but were denied the request, except for Canada). What 
would prevent the government of the Ukraine from taking such steps if the 
registry were stationed in the Ukraine? See Julia Barton, Ukraine’s Domain 
in Dot-Dispute, WIRED NEWS (June 22, 2001), at http://www.wired.com/ 
news/politics/0,1283,44012,00.html.  
 88. Early in March 2002, the South African government proposed legisla-
tion, the Electronic Communications and Transactions Bill, which would 
nationalize the administration of its ccTLD “.za.” If enacted, the law would 
prohibit any organization from continuing its operation as a “.za” administra-
tor. See Bill on Internet Due Soon , supra note 63; Cyber Cops to Ensure Safe 
Surfing, supra note 63 (noting that the bill was tabled in March 2002). The 
government of Ireland has also taken steps to assert its jurisdiction over the 
administration of its ccTLD.  See Denis Kelleher, Cybersquatters’ Rights Go 
West Under New Laws, IRISH TIMES, May 15, 2000, at 8 (noting that legisla-
tion would allow the Minister of Public Enterprise to control rules governing 
domain name registration in Ireland); Karlin Lillington, Digital Gesture by 
President Makes History, IRISH TIMES, July 11, 2000, at 16 (noting passage of 
legislation).  
 89. See, e.g., IANA, IANA REPORT ON REQUEST FOR REDELEGATION OF THE 
.PN TOP-LEVEL DOMAIN (2000), available at http://www.icann.org/general/pn-
report-11feb00.htm (Pitcairn Island); ICANN Watch, VeriSign Buzzes with 
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to the system and to ICANN as registries of gTLDs do. They 
have signed contracts with ICANN as required, and pay regis-
tration fees. But these registries are a minuscule minority of 
the 240 ccTLD registries. The others, such as those serving 
France, Germany and the U.K., are generally the designates of 
the governments of those countries, and the governments as-
sert the right to re-delegate the management of the ccTLDs to 
others. Generally, as between the registries and the govern-
ments this is not an issue, and the registries consider them-
selves as an arm of their governments to further their govern-
ments’ political and social policies.  
Although these registries have been paying ICANN dues that 
cover about a third of ICANN’s budget, many have not signed 
ICANN’s contracts. Because they are not uniform in their func-
tions and relationships to their governments, and because 
ICANN does not service all registries, a standard contract does 
not fit all of them. The text of these contracts has been negoti-
ated for some time, and a number of contract models have been 
developed both for those registries that ICANN services and 
those that it does not.90 In the process, feathers have been ruf-
fled. In one case, ICANN has written to their governments, and 
this letter has raised the ire of the registries because some 
have interpreted the language to invite a review of the regis-
tries’ performance.91 In sum, ICANN’s relationship with many 
  
the .bz Biz(ness), at http://www.icannwatch.org/article.php?sid=185 (May 31, 
2001); .NU, .NU Domain /IUS-N Mission, at http://www.nunames.nu/ 
about/about.cfm (last visited Apr. 20, 2002); The .tv Corporation, About Us, at 
http://www.tv/en-def-e9763cedc23f/en/about/about_ company_overview.shtml? 
Hhtype=content6/20/01 (last visited Apr. 20, 2002). 
 90. For a draft of a contract between ICANN and ccTLD registries, see 
ICANN, CENTR Draft Contract for Services, at http://www.icann.org/ 
cctlds/centr-7th-draft-contract-20sep00.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2002).  For a 
draft of a proposed unsponsored TLD agreement with ICANN, dated Septem-
ber 21, 2001, see ICANN, Proposed Unsponsored TLD Agreement, at  
http://www.icann.org/tlds/agreements/unsponsored/registry-agmt-26apr01.ht  
m (Apr. 26, 2001).  For a discussion draft of a ccTLD Manager-ICANN 
“Status Quo” Agreement, see ICANN, Discussion Draft of ccTLD Manager-
ICANN “Status-Quo” Agreement, at http://www.icann.org/yokohama/draft-
cctld-status -quo-agreement-05jul00.htm (July 5, 2000); William New, Net 
Governance:  ICANN Nears Deal on Country-Specific Domains, NAT ’L J. 
TECH. DAILY, Mar. 12, 2001, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.  See 
also Revolt Threatens ICANN’s Budget, supra note 43.   
 91. See ICANN, Discussion Draft of Letter to Governments Regarding 
ccTLD Managers, at http://www.icann.org/cctlds/draft-letter-to-govts-
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of these registries has not yet been formalized, and the task is 
formidable.92  
Historically, both ICANN and the ccTLD registries have 
adopted a “hands off” approach towards each other’s activities. 
That has changed as ICANN sought to formalize its relation-
ship with these registries — establishing controlling measures 
over them — and the registries demanded a greater role in 
ICANN and its policy decision making.93 This is significant. 
The registries did not repudiate or question ICANN’s author-
ity. On the contrary, they demanded a greater voice in its 
power structure, that is, they demanded membership on its 
board.94 The latest proposed structure of ICANN might resolve 
the issue. ccTLDs or their governments will pay dues to 
ICANN. The governments will occupy a board seat, however, 
and that might satisfy the demand for a greater voice in 
ICANN’s government. ICANN’s power as an entity will then be 
augmented by further support and money.  
4. The Three Events Demonstrate ICANN’s Increasing Power 
The three events described above differ. One involves a dis-
pute between a sovereign state and a registry of its ccTLD. The 
second is a dispute is between ccTLD registries, the DNSO and 
  
12nov00.htm (Nov. 12, 2000); Mark Ward, Name Row Threatens the Net , BBC 
NEWS (Nov. 28, 2000), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/ 
sci/tech/newsid_1043000/1043509.stm. 
 92. See Sticky Issues, supra note 50; Sableman, supra note 51. 
 93. Juliana Gruenwald, Domain Group Revolts Against ICANN, at 
http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2767690.html (May 31, 
2001); Andrew Orlowski, Country Domain Chiefs Prefer Jaw-Jaw to War-
War, REGISTER (June 14, 2001), at http://www.theregister.co.uk/ con-
tent/6/19712.html. 
 94. ICANN’s relationship to the registry of “.us” is unclear, as is the fate of 
the ccTLD. It is likely, however, that whoever wins the bid on this ccTLD will 
have to conform to ICANN’s policies.  See ICANN Watch, More on the .us 
Solicitation, at http://www.icannwatch.org/article.php?sid=208 (last visited 
Apr. 21, 2002). But see Brian Kahin, Making Policy by Solicitation: The Out-
sourcing of .us, at http://icannwatch.org/essays/kahin.htm (July 16, 2001) 
(suggesting that the winning contractor will determine policies and criticizing 
the current proposal to auction “.us”). While prior to 1999, IANA determined 
policy and NSI acted as a registry and performed the registration, after 1999, 
the policy function shifted to ICANN. NSI continued as a registry and regis-
tration became competitive, supervised by ICANN. It seems that under this 
plan, if ICANN is not the supervisor of the contract operator, it would be 
losing some of its hegemony.  
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ICANN. The third case represents a disagreement between 
ICANN and an aspiring ccTLD registry. All three events dem-
onstrate recognition of ICANN’s power to determine the exis-
tence and nature of ccTLDs, and the power to affect, at least by 
qualifications and imposition of fees, the identity and functions 
of the registries of these ccTLDs. The Australian government 
applied to ICANN to determine its dispute with the existing 
registry of its ccTLD.95 Professor Elz may have implied 
ICANN’s power to select or qualify registries because indirectly 
he based his rights on Dr. Postel’s appointment rather than on 
the appointment by his government. The ccTLD registries felt 
that the DNSO, to which these registries belonged, did not rep-
resent the registries’ interests. Therefore, the registries left the 
DNSO, but did not leave ICANN. Instead they demanded a 
more prominent place in its organization: a separate support-
ing organization and the right to appoint, select or recommend 
directors to its board.96 The registries were critical of ICANN’s 
operating practices but not of ICANN “as an organization.”97 
The registries argued that there should be “no taxation without 
representation.”98 The use of these words is revealing. The 
power to tax is governmental; the right to representation is 
that of the citizen. It is unclear, however, whether the regis-
tries placed themselves in the position of citizens and ICANN 
— in the position of a government. That is because the regis-
tries viewed their payments as fees for specific services and not 
  
 95. See ICANN’s Help, supra note 73. 
 96. See Laura Rohde, Defections at ICANN’s Support Organization , 
INDUSTRY STANDARD.COM , June 4, 2001, LEXIS, News Library, News Group 
File [hereinafter Defections]; European Domains Want ICANN’s Attention, 
supra note 50.  For the language of the registries’ resolution, see WorldWide 
Alliance of Top Level Domain Names, Executive Summary of ccTLD Stock-
holm Meeting on 31 May and 1 June 2001, at http://www.wwtld.org/meet-
ings/cctld/Stockholm2001/Executive_summary_.01June2001.html (last vis-
ited Apr. 21, 2002).  Arguably, not all registries were of the same mind. Of 
the over 250 registries, only thirty-one voted to make the demand and take 
the action. However, the others did not object nor abstain, but simply did not 
take part in the process. See Ward, supra note 91.   
 97. Defections, supra note 96.  
 98. Id.  See also Mark Ward, Net Groups in World Wide Wrangle,  BBC 
NEWS (July 4, 2000), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/ 
sci/tech/newsid_817000/ 817657.stm (stating that the registries believe that 
the costs levied on them stem from legal costs of ICANN’s dealing with NSI, 
and refuse to pay for costs over which they had no control).  
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as financing the operations of ICANN generally. But perhaps 
they only meant that if they financed ICANN’s operations they 
ought to have a say about the way the money is spent. In any 
event, the registries recognized ICANN as the regulator of the 
ccTLDs, both by explicitly mentioning their recognition and by 
demanding greater power in the organization. 
5. The Position of the U.S. Department of Commerce 
On June 25, 2001, the DOC responded to a request by Mr. 
William H. Bode on behalf of Atlantic Root Network, Inc. (“At-
lantic”). Atlantic was concerned about ICANN’s process in se-
lecting new TLDs. The DOC stated in part:  
 
In July 1998, the Department of Commerce made it clear 
that it would not participate in the selection process of new 
TLDs as set forth in the Statement of Policy, entitled Man-
agement of Internet Names and Addresses. . . . In the State-
ment of Policy, the Department recognized that the selection 
of new TLDs should be conducted by the private sector 
through a not-for-profit organization, globally representative 
of the Internet stakeholder community. The Department rec-
ognized ICANN as that organization in November 1998 
through a Memorandum of Understanding. 
We note that at its May 2001 board of directors meeting, 
ICANN approved the establishment of a New TLD Evaluation 
Process Planning Task Force (Task Force) ro [sic] monitor the 
implementation process and to evaluate the selection process 
of the new TLDs. The ICANN board resolution stated that the 
Task Force will make recommendations to the ICANN board 
and the Internet community regarding the selection process. 
It is our understanding that the Task Force will allow public 
input when formulating its recommendations. We encourage 
you to participate in this opportunity. In a recent letter to 
ICANN, the Department encouraged ICANN to move forward 
in the selection of new TLDs in order to increase competition 
in the domain name space. 
Again, we encourage you to direct Atlantic Root Network’s 
concern regarding ICANN’s selection process directly to 
ICANN. 
 
Sincerely, 
[Signed] 
John F. Sopko 
Acting Assistant Secretary for  
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Communications and Information 99 
The letter speaks for itself, making it clear that the U.S. sup-
ports ICANN in this matter, and recognizes ICANN’s power 
most explicitly. The government encouraged the complainant to 
apply to ICANN. It is not surprising that the only party that 
did not concede ICANN’s power was the aspiring rejected regis-
try.  
6. The Latest Move to Restructure 
The latest move of ICANN’s staff to restructure demon-
strates how the institution is reaching for power. The proposal 
would greatly minimize constraints over the board and the 
staff. It would eliminate nine publicly elected directors and 
substitute for them fewer — (five) — representatives of gov-
ernments reflecting the five regions of the globe.100 Thus, each 
of ICANN’s board members will represent specific identified 
interests, and will be selected by these interests. Governments 
will presumably ensure that ICANN will be better endowed 
and staffed. If this proposal is put into effect and if it works, 
ICANN will become stronger. At the same time, if its members 
contain each other’s claims to hegemony, its overall powers 
may remain in check. 
IV. BOUNDARIES OF POWER  
A. Contestable Markets Theory 
The introduction to this Article describes the theory of con-
testable markets. ICANN’s circumstances (from its first birth-
day to its third birthday) bring to mind this theory and help 
explain ICANN’s evolution. In fact, the inadequacies of the 
theory in the markets context are less pronounced in the con-
text of power.  I assume that the stability of the Internet re-
quires the existence of a single root. I further assume that if 
  
 99. Letter from John F. Sopko, Acting Assistant Secretary for Communi-
cations and Information, U.S. Department of Commerce, to William H. Bode, 
Partner, Bode & Beckman, LLP (June 25, 2001), quoted in ICANN Watch, 
Commerce Dept: We Don’t Do TLDs, at  http://www.icannwatch.org/arti-
cle.php?sid=237&mode=nested&order=0 (July 8, 2001). 
 100. See PRESIDENT’S REPORT, supra note 7. 
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more than one manager manages the root, the financial and 
social costs of the Internet would rise. The two cooks will spoil 
the broth. Therefore, the structure of the Internet naming and 
numbering system mandates a single manager — a natural 
monopolist. I assume further that there is no superpower that 
regulates ICANN. The question is whether this monopoly will 
result in an excessive exercise of power, similar to excessive 
charges that a monopolist would extort from consumers.  
B. The Nature of the Market for Power 
The market that is discussed here is the market for manag-
ing the numbering and naming system. While in the business 
market competitors seek rents represented mostly by money, 
the rents from the power of ICANN are varied. These rents in-
clude the ability of the power holder to ensure the stability of 
the Internet and the integrity of the naming and numbering 
system. The power holder can guard over the technical integ-
rity of the system, or maintain and expand the value of its in-
vestments in the current system as registry or ISP. The power 
holder can control the system for political reasons or protect 
one’s trademarks by freezing or reducing the number of addi-
tional upper-level domain names.  
Potential competitors may be interested in social benefits, 
and the stronger they are as potential competitors, the greater 
is ICANN’s constraint on its power to conflict with these social 
benefits. These self-interested goals cannot be achieved unilat-
erally because the Internet is dependent on the support and 
actions of many others with other agendas (e.g., governments, 
legislatures and different ISPs). They must all agree to the 
management’s edicts. By their consent to ICANN they can 
achieve their own self-interested objectives, at least to an ac-
ceptable degree.101 It is the management power and its law-
making capabilities that are the product in this market.102  
  
 101. ICANN’s power and the power of money are similar. Both are a store 
of value through which other objectives can be achieved. In fact, these are two 
different aspects of freedom and coercion. It is important to note that the 
purpose for which power is held is not the topic here. Power, like money, can 
be obtained voluntarily by consent from others, and usually in an exchange. 
Power, like money, can also be obtained from others by violence and extor-
tion. The use of money, however, is generally more limited than the use of 
power. Money can be used coercively if it is necessary to obtain values (as-
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The power for which there is a market in this case is of two 
kinds. One relates to particular actions in the exercise of man-
agement and lawmaking — “specific power.” The other is the 
power to take over all the managerial and lawmaking activities 
— “general power.” Firms that produce a number of related 
products can “cross-subsidize” their products and thereby block 
market entry to competitors that produce only one type of 
product.  Arguably, like business corporations, ICANN can 
cross-subsidize one type of special power by another type of 
special power. For example, it can subsidize qualification re-
quirements for other less stringent contract terms. However, 
many of ICANN’s potential competitors, such as governments, 
are also multi-product firms in this sense. They too can subsi-
dize one special power by another. The difference between 
these potential competitors and ICANN is in their institutional 
structure. As compared to ICANN, they have limited powers 
outside their territories but greater power within their territo-
ries. Even ISPs have some multi-product capabilities and can 
cross-subsidize. Thus, ICANN’s competitors seem to be 
stronger than one-product business competitors. 
C. The Competitors that Present a Constraining Force to the 
Monopolist  
Under the contestable markets theory, competitors who can 
constrain the monopolist are those whose sunken costs are 
similar to the monopolist’s sunken costs. Sunken costs for a 
general power are the costs of establishing a broad supporting 
coalition to take over ICANN’s general power or at least to cre-
ate a credible threat of such a possible takeover. Thus, if the 
members of ICANN’s current supporting coalition were dissat-
isfied with the existing ICANN and had sufficient power to 
establish a different entity, they would present a formidable   
sets) which other persons want. The person who has bread and would not 
part with it except through money has power over the hungry person. Yet 
this power is based on the possession of the bread, not the money. 
 102. ICANN’s power can be analogized to the power of other managers and 
the market for chief executive officers.  They compete for the position of man-
agers by obtaining the consent (or at least the passive non-intervention) of 
shareholders, nominators, existing top management, unions and perhaps 
others that wield power in the corporation. Or they may only receive the sup-
port of the nominators. They do, however, have competitors. Their market is 
small, though not a monopoly. But it may be sufficiently small to resemble a 
contestable market. 
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tablish a different entity, they would present a formidable 
threat to ICANN’s existence, and could force it to restructure or 
comply in other ways.  
Alternatively, if a coalition of other competitors is sufficiently 
strong to convince the actors in the Internet infrastructure to 
cease following ICANN’s instruction and the single root, the 
possibility and existence of such a coalition would deter ICANN 
from exercising any power in a way that would displease this 
coalition. In February 2002, I believed that this scenario is 
unlikely. Today, that may not be the case. As the management 
of ICANN proposed a new structure, Dr. David Farber, a re-
spected academic who was involved in the design of the naming 
and numbering system, and others have raised the possibility 
of removing the powers of ICANN to another technical organi-
zation. In fact, the proposal would resurrect some of Dr. Pos-
tel’s hegemony.103  
Another scenario that is unique to the Internet is the possi-
ble addition of new names through existing ISPs. I consider 
this scenario a threat of competitors of specific power, not gen-
eral power. The competitors’ investment or sunken costs in the 
market for specific power are the costs of establishing a coali-
tion aimed at the specific power, or a credible threat to the ex-
ercise (or non-exercise) of that specific power. As in the case of 
the commercial markets, the market for power, in which 
ICANN operates, is populated by different actors with different 
entry costs. They may exert political power, form coalitions or 
offer rich revenues. Their sunken costs need not be higher than 
ICANN’s entry costs, or may be lower, especially in the case of 
special powers.  
The exit costs of such competitors should be close to zero if 
their investments can be used elsewhere. However, once a 
power structure is established, the very loss of the power is not 
a zero loss even if the coalition can continue to exist and flex its 
muscle, for example, by entering ICANN’s power structure. The 
investment in creating a competitor to ICANN may be high, 
because the powerful interests that are potential competitors 
conflict, and the competitors would be successful only if they 
find a better way to complement their interests than the one 
  
 103. See ICANN “A Failure” Says ICANN, NEWSWIRE (VNU), Mar. 19, 2002, 
LEXIS, News Library, News Group File. 
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found by ICANN.104 Otherwise, potential competitors would 
enter the market only if ICANN exerts a higher degree of 
power than they would together.  If ICANN increases or ex-
tends its power, competitors may invest in entering the market 
to enjoy the benefits of the greater power until it will dilute by 
the mere existence of the competition. Then they will exit, as 
the exit costs are not high for them. 
D. Differences Between Business and Power Markets  
One difference between the business market and the power 
market is that potential competitors can constrain ICANN’s 
power exercise not only by threatening to assert their own 
claims to power, but also by withdrawing their support of 
ICANN. A monopolist in the business market does not need the 
support of its competitors — he receives the support from the 
consumers. A monopolist in the power market may need that 
support, and ICANN needs it. Withdrawal involves no direct 
cost to competitors, but it may be very costly if it undermines 
ICANN and produces a worse alternative.105  
Further, while in the business market competitors threaten 
to offer a competing product, in the power market competitors 
can threaten to exert power with respect to one special “power 
product.” If ICANN attempts to exercise power that competi-
tors deem to provide “higher rents,” these competitors may en-
ter the market, but only in the area requiring low — or no — 
investment (they already have the power), and where exit is 
costless (they will exercise the power elsewhere), while the 
benefit from entry provides high rents. It is harder in the 
power market to calculate a quantifiable price in terms of 
power that a monopolist should “charge.” Even in the business 
  
 104. While outsiders who wish to get into the ISP and registry business and 
increase the number of domain names may try to form such a coalition, they 
will have to overcome the power of the governments and those who would 
oppose the extension, as well as those who would be concerned about the 
stability of the Internet. Thus, it may well be that those who wish to enter 
the field with two roots will have higher costs than those who would wish to 
replace ICANN with one root only.  
 105. ICANN may refrain from exercising its power, for example, to estab-
lish additional domain names opening the doors to new businesses. Potential 
competitors may form coalitions to overcome the inaction, and ICANN may 
take steps to stymie their efforts.     
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market this determination has raised a debate. In the power 
market one can only speculate.  
E. When Competitors Will Cooperate 
The contestable market theory is not helpful to predict 
ICANN’s evolution if its competitors cooperate, and this possi-
bility is not negligible. Presumably, cooperation among the 
competitors should be encouraged. It is then renamed a con-
sensus. In fact, the proposed restructure of ICANN seems to be 
heading towards such a coalition and power sharing. A broad-
based participation within ICANN signifying a broad-based 
consensus could lend ICANN legitimacy. Its monopoly power 
will be constrained from within, as the different interests nego-
tiate. To this extent, ICANN may resemble a policy-making 
legislative body.  
However, legislatures are elected. ICANN is a not-for-profit 
organization. The power of elected bodies is bestowed on them 
by the votes. Therefore, elected members must account for their 
actions to those who bestowed the power on them — the voters. 
The assets of a not-for-profit corporation are donated usually 
by its directors (or the directors’ designates). They exercise 
their management power with a sense of entitlement that their 
donations give them. Theirs is not a legal duty to account to 
others; theirs is a duty to account to their conscience. This is 
ICANN’s deepest and most serious dilemma.  
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article focused on balance of power and structure. It 
said very little about the crucial component of legitimacy. An 
organization that lacks clear support of law in a country, lacks 
a vote of a democratic body politic, lacks a theoretical following 
of professionals and lacks a popular trust is vulnerable. It is 
unclear whether political strategies and machinations will sus-
tain it for long. What this Article discusses is another form of 
sustenance that does not depend on legitimacy but on raw con-
tainment of power. Such containment may not be long-term 
because the actions of the participants are based on self-
interest rather than self-governing principles. Its power does 
not rest on the rule of consensus except the consensus to rule. 
Whether this base will be sufficient for longevity remains to be 
seen. On the other hand, if ICANN becomes a platform for ne-
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gotiations among the interested parties, and in time facilitates 
the development of acceptable rules and consensus, it will have 
become a most impressive and unique success. 
In a very insightful book, Ruling the Waves, Debora L. Spar 
suggests that significant innovations pass through four 
stages.106 They first introduce chaos.107 Next, from the chaos 
there emerge rules and some patterns of behavior.108 Eventu-
ally, these patterns form institutions.109 Finally, and surpris-
ingly, the institutions begin to look and behave as familiar in-
stitutions serving the same purposes through and with the aid 
of the new technology.110 ICANN may be a very good test case 
for this prediction. The naming and numbering system has 
passed through a chaotic stage, emerging as ICANN with rules 
that are resisted in part, and evolving into an institution. The 
last stage of “globalization” and the Internet naming system 
may be grounded in the states or federations of states repre-
senting the political systems. Accountability, community values 
and public interest will return to their rightful position. Busi-
ness and technical interests will find their voice, but it will not 
be the dominant voice. We may thus return to the basic form of 
civic organization, adding to it the Internet service with suffi-
cient links to the rest of the world. Then we could say that 
there is nothing new under the sun. 
 
  
 106. See SPAR , supra note 4, at 11-22. 
 107. See id. at 11-12. 
 108. See id. at 12-15. 
 109. See id. at 15-18. 
 110. See id. at 18-22. 
